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POLICE SCIENCE LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
Nat P. Ozmon*
Wire Taps Allowed in Evidence Over Defendant's Objection that the Re-
cording' Had Been Tampered With-Defendant was convicted of perjury. Dur-
ing the trial wire taps that had been made pursuant to an order of the County
Court were admitted for the prosecution. These recordings were held admis-
sible to rebut an attack on the credibility of the government's witnesses in
spite of the defendant's objections of illegality and lack of authenticity. On
appeal the court held that all objections had been properly overruled and that
the recordings were correctly received in evidence. People v. Feld, 113
N.E.2d 440 (N.Y. 1953). The defendant had particularly challenged the
authefiticity of the recordings because of frequent pauses in the conversations,
especially a pause of about forty-five seconds during which the name of the
defendant was spoken. A wire-tap expert testified that he could not tell
whether words had been inserted or if the record was the original. There-
after, on objection by the prosecution, the witness was not allowed to state
why he could not tell nor give his opinion as to what accounted for these
pauses. The appellate court found both of these rulings unquestionably
correct as the pauses had been accounted for by the circumstance that the
recordings were of a three-way conversation. The court also held that, al-
though the chief inspector had heard the recordings played prior to the
prosecution, the court did not err in denying to the defendant the chance
to elicit information from the inspector as to whether at that time he had
heard the defendant's, name mentioned in the recordings. It should be noted
that three judges dissented. They felt that it was impossible to justify the
rulings that prevented the defendant from attempting to prove that the
record had been tampered with as the authenticity of this evidence was a
critical issue.
Handwritten Motions Made By Defendant While Acting As Own Attorney
Are Admissible as Standards of Comparison-In the case of Shelton v. United
States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir. 1953), the defendant conducted his own de-
fense to a charge of transporting a stolen motor vehicle in interstate com-
merce. In the course of the trial certain handwritten motions which the
defendant had presented to the court were used as standards of comparison.
These papers were properly identified by the clerk of the court as papers
filed by the defendant personally in the instant case. The Court of Appeals
held that these papers were proper standards and the use of them did not
violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.
Court Review of Civil Service Commission Discharge of P.olice Captain-
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in a 4 to 3 decision, recently reversed the Illi-
nois Appellate Court and the Civil Service Commission of Chicago in pro-
ceedings under the Illinois Administrative Review Act wherein the plaintiff,
Thomas Harrison, had been discharged from his position as a police captain
in Chicago. The court held that the finding of the commission that Harrison
had violated police department regulations by accepting a gift for services
rendered as a member of the department and that such conduct was cause
for discharge was without evidentiary support and, thus, the previous action
of the Superior Court in setting aside the order of the Commission had been
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proper. Thomas Harrison. v. Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago,
(Ill. 1953).
The Civil Service Commission had found the plaintiff guilty of accepting
and receiving $30,000 in 1937 for services rendered or pretended to be ren-
dered to one John J. Lynch while a member of the police department with-
out the consent of the commissi6ner of police. Harrison was suspended the
day the charges were filed and he thereafter instituted proceedings under the
Administrative Review Act. The evidence relevant to the infraction showed
that Harrison and Lynch had met in 1931 and had been close friends until
Lynch's death in 194-5. Prior .to their meeting Lynch, who was involved in
gambling operations, had been kidnapped and apparently Harrison acted as
a bodyguard for him during times when they were together. After some six
years of association, Lynch endeavored to persuade Harrison to enter some
business other than police work and offered to finance such a venture, but
Harrison said he preferred to remain with the police force. Lynch repeated
his offer in 1937 and gave Harrison an envelope containing $30,000. telling
him to buy some securities for his wife and daughter and himself. Harrison
said that he had never expected to be paid for anything he had donie for
Lynch but Lynch replied that he had plenty more and not to worry about it.
The charge against the plaintiff was that he had violated section 29 of
rule 389 of the department, which subjects to disciplinary action any police
officer for "receiving or accepting a reward or gift from a person for service
rendered or pretended to be rendered, as a member of the department, with-
out the consent of the Commissioner of Police." The Civil Service Commis-
sion's theory was that the plaintiff's association with Lynch was carried on
as a member of the department, even though it was conducted during his
off-duty hours and that the gift he received was for these services. The
Supreme Court, however, felt that the police regulation clearly does not pro-
hibit a policeman from accepting all gifts nor does it refer to all gifts
accepted while a person is on the force. According to Harrison's testimony,
the relation between Harrison and Lynch had been completely unscheduled
and sporadic and had taken place when Harrison was not performing his
official work. Furthermore, the association continued with undefined duties
until long after the date of the gift. The court felt that these circumstances,
combined with the tremendous amount of the gift, negatived any inference
that the $30,000 had been given in connection with a contract of employment.
The city also contended that it was not within the power of the court to
review the evidence with reference to the findings of fact of the Civil Serv-
ic6 Commission. Therefore, this case involved a determination of the scope
of judicial review of an order of the Civil Service Commission. The case was
brought under the Administrative Review Act which applies to proceedings
for the judicial review of a decision of an administrative agency where the
act creating such an agency adopts the provisions of the Act. The Act
provides that no new evidence shall be heard by the court and that the con-
clusions of the agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie
correct. However, these provisions have been construed to mean that courts
do have the power and also the duty to consider the record to determine if
the findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. The court felt
that this scope of review does not offend the constitutional doctrines of
separation of powers and that the court is obliged by this act to examine
the record and determine if the findings of the commission are supported by
evidence. Three members of the court dissented on the ground that the ma-
jority of the court had not correctly interpreted the facts but agreed with the
majority as to the scope of judicial review.
[Vol. 4-4
